The paper first proves the completeness of the (non-modal) first-order predicate logic presented in Carnap's 1946 article 'Modalities and quantification'. By contrast the modal logic defined by the semantics Carnap produces is unaxiomatisable. One can though adapt Carnap's semantics so that a standard completeness proof for a Carnapian version of predicate S5 turns out to be available.
presence of constants enables there to be atomic sentences like ϕab. Truth and falsity in FL are relative to a state-description (Carnap 1946, p. 50, and 1947, p. 9) . Formally, a state−description s for a language L of first-order predicate logic is a set of atomic sentences or their negations, such that for every n−place predicate ϕ of L , and every ntuple of constants a 1 ,..., a n , either ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ s or ∼ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ s, but not both. In place of relativising the truth of an open formula to an assignment to the variables Carnap defines truth only for sentences. If s is any state-description, I write s |= α to mean that α is true in s and s =| α to mean that α is false in s. The truth of a sentence α in a state-description s may be defined formally by the following valuation rules:
[Vϕ ] s |= ϕ a 1 ...a n if ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ s, and s =| ϕa 1 ...a n if ∼ ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ s Say that a sentence α is valid , or in Carnap's words L-true, iff s |= α for every state-description s.
Carnap produces an axiomatic basis for what he calls 'FC'. In Carnap's terminology a 'logic' is a semantic specification of a set of formulae, while a 'calculus' is an axiomatic specification. 'FC' stands for 'functional calculus', and I shall use it to refer to the version presented here of Carnap's axiomatic system. Carnap refers to axioms as 'primitive sentences'. In place of Carnap's ( ) to indicate a universal closure of a wff, I shall write ∀α. More specifically, where α is any wff, ∀α denotes α preceded by a (finite) sequence of universal quantifiers, in any order, which includes one for every variable free in α. (Where α is a sentence then α itself is an instance of ∀α.) With that notation Carnap's first axiom schema, D8−1a (p. 52), can be written as:
PC Any wff of the form ∀α where α is a PC−tautology, i.e., where α can be obtained from a valid formula of the classical propositional calculus by uniform substitution of wff of L for its propositional variables. 4 and the remaining schemata can be represented as:
, where x is not free in α.
, where α[y/x ] is just like α except in having free y in place of free x , where y is any variable for which x is free
, where α[a/x ] is just like α except in having a in place of free x , where a is any constant
, where α and β are alike except that α has free x in 0 or more places where β has free y. 5
I3 a = b where a and b are different constants.
The only transformation rule is modus ponens:
In MP of course, given that α and α ⊃ β, then α and β and α ⊃ β must all be sentences. Carnap's axiomatisation follows that of Quine 1940 in restricting theorems to closed wff. In what follows proofs will be given in outline only, especially where full proofs may be found of these or similar theorems on pp. 80-115 of Quine's book. The principal non−standard feature is I3, which entails that all state descriptions are infinite, and, as Carnap points out on p. 53, sentences like ∃x ∃y x = y are true in universes containing more than one individual.
We cannot, in Carnap's basis, appeal to the rule of universal generalisation in the form, α → ∀x α, because Carnap's theorems are all sentences. Nor can we appeal to the rule α → ∀x (α[x /a]), (where α[x /a] is α with free x replacing every occurrence of a in α), since, when a and b are distinct constants we have a = b, but we do not have ∀x x = b. 6 However we can prove the following: Theorem 1. If α, and a is any constant, then, for some n ≥ 0, there are constants
, provided x does not become bound in α[x /a] as a result of the substitution. (We allow the degenerate case in which there are no bs, so that here n = 0, and we have simply ∀x α[x /a].)
Proof. The proof is by induction on the proof of α, and depends on the fact that if α then α is closed. First suppose that α is an instance of one of the axiom schemata PC-I2. Then ∀x (α[x /a]) remains an instance of that very same schema. This may be seen by inspection. So for these cases the theorem holds where n = 0. The remaining case is I3:
I3 is an instance of PC, and I3 follows from I1 and I2 using ∀1b. 7 Further, MP preserves the rule, since suppose we are given α and α ⊃ β. Then, by the induction hypothesis, we may assume that there are b 1 , ..., b n , and c 1 , ..., c k such that
From (i) and (ii), by PC and ∀ ⊃ we have
and so the theorem holds for β.
The next three results are proved in an appendix:
6 Compare Carnap's remarks in T7.2 and T7.3 in Carnap 1946, p. 51f. 7 This may be proved as follows:
Where ∀xα is a sentence and b 1 , ..., b n are any constants then, In proving soundness we make use of the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Where s is any state-description and α is any wff, where the variables free in α are x 1 , ..., x n , and s |= α[a 1 /x 1 , ..., a n /x n ] for all constants a 1 , ..., a n ; then s |= ∀α.
Proof. Soundness may be proved in the usual way, by proving that all axioms are valid and that MP preserves validity. Lemma 5 guarantees that the schematic axioms may be stated, without affecting validity, by leaving off the initial ∀, and replacing each distinct free variable by a distinct constant not otherwise occurring, and we shall consider them in this form. Obviously, if α is an instance of a tautology then, for every state-description s, In proving completeness we have to shew that if s |= α for all state-descriptions then FC α. In fact we would like to get the stronger form of completeness by shewing that if a set Λ of sentences is FC−consistent then there is a state-description s such that s |= α for every α ∈ Λ. At this point we have to bear in mind that the set of state-descriptions is relative to a language L . For take the set Ω = { ∼ ∀xϕx, ϕa 1 , ..., ϕa n , ...} where ϕa i ∈ Ω for every constant a i in L . This set is not true in any state-description for L . We can, however, extend L to a language L + by adding a denumerable infinity of new constants not in L , so that Ω is satisfiable in L + , though there will be a new Ω + unsatisfiable in L + . This means that where Λ is a consistent set of sentences of a language L then Λ may not be satisfiable in L , though there will be an extension L + of L such that Λ is satisfiable with respect to the state-descriptions, not of L , but of L + . 8 Call a set Λ of sentences of L , FC−consistent (or simply consistent) iff there are no α 1 ,..., α n ∈ Λ such that FC ∼ (α 1 ∧ ... ∧ α n ). Suppose Λ is a consistent set of sentences of a language L . A set Γ of sentences is maximal in L iff for every sentence α of L , either α ∈ Γ or ∼α ∈ Γ. Since FC is finitary Λ will still be consistent in L + , where L + contains infinitely many constants not in L , and therefore not in Λ. The presence of I3 requires a change in what is called on p. 257 of Hughes and Cresswell 1996 the ∀-property. In a language without constants a set ∆ has ∀-property iff for every wff in L of the form ∀x α there is some variable y such that α[y/x] ⊃ ∀xα ∈ ∆, and the standard technique for giving a consistent set the ∀-property, as for instance described in theorem 14.1 on p. 258 of Hughes and Cresswell 1996, has as a consequence that y does not occur in α. However, I3 makes the sentence a = b ⊃ ∀x x = b inconsistent where a is any constant distinct from b, and therefore inconsistent where a is not in x = b. For that reason we shall introduce the Carnapian ∀-property, or ∀ C -property:
Lemma 7. Suppose Γ is a maximal-consistent set of sentences with the ∀ C -property, and suppose that ∀x α is a sentence such that α[a/x ] is in Γ for every constant a of L . Then ∀x α ∈ Γ.
Proof. If Γ has the ∀ C -property then there is some a, such that for some
and so, by theorem 3, ∀x α ∈ Γ.
For a Carnapian language we may define the (ordinary) ∀-property of a set ∆ of sentences to hold when, for every sentence ∀x α, there is some constant a such that α[a/x ] ⊃ ∀x α ∈ ∆. From lemma 7 we have the following: Corollary 8. If Γ is a maximal-consistent set with the ∀ C -property then Γ has the ∀-property.
The case of a = b ⊃ ∀x x = b shews that in some cases the ∀-property requires a constant already occurring in α. In this case we require b = b ⊃ ∀x x = b.
Theorem 9.
Where Λ is an FC-consistent set of sentences of a language L then there is a consistent set ∆ with the ∀ C -property in a language L + which contains infinitely many constants not in L , such that Λ ⊆ ∆ entails a failure of compactness in the sense that, although every finite subset of a set Λ of sentence of a language L may be satisfied by a state description for L , Λ itself may not, though it will be satisfiable in a language with infinitely constants not in L . The difference between the present completeness proof and more standard ones is that in the present case, though not in the standard case, the extension of the language is effectively accompanied by an extension of the domain.
Proof. Theorem 9 is proved by specifying a sequence ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 , ..., ∆ n , ... defined as follows. Assume that there is an enumeration of wff of L each of which contains just one free variable, so that α n contains free x n , and so on. ∆ 0 is Λ, and, for 1 ≤ n, every b 1 , ..., b k , there are β 1 , . .., β m ∈ ∆ n−1 such that
From (i) we have that there are γ 1 ,..., γ i ∈ ∆ n−1 such that
and so, by theorem 2, since a does not occur in ∆ n−1 , there are constants c 1 ,..., c h such that
Now (i) holds for every b 1 , ..., b k and so, in particular for c 1 , ..., c h , and so there are δ 1 , ..., δ j ∈ ∆ n−1 such that
and so
But from (iii) we have
which with (v) yields
in which case ∆ n−1 would be inconsistent. Let ∆ be the union of all the ∆ n s. ∆ is consistent for the usual reasons. Further ∆ has the ∀ C −property in L + .
Finally let Γ be a maximal−consistent set containing ∆. By corollary 8, theorem 9 establishes that Γ has the ∀-property. Now let s Γ , be the state-description which consists of ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ s Γ if ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ Γ, and ∼ ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ s Γ if ∼ ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ Γ.
Proof. The result is defined for ϕa 1 ...a n , and is obvious for ⊥. If s Γ |= a = b, then these are the same constant, and from I1 we then have a = b ∈ Γ. If s Γ |= a = b, then these are distinct constants, and from I3 we have a = b ∈ Γ. The induction for ⊥ and ⊃ is standard. Suppose s Γ =| ∀xα. Then there is a constant a such that s Γ =| α[a/x ]. So, by the induction hypothesis α[a/x ] ∈ Γ, and therefore, by ∀1b, ∀x α ∈ Γ. Suppose ∀x α ∈ Γ. Since Γ has the ∀-property there is some a such that α[a/x ] ⊃ ∀x α. But then α[a/x ] ∈ Γ, and so, by the induction hypothesis, s Γ =| α[a/x ] and so s Γ =| ∀x α.
Completeness follows in the usual way. The main interest of Carnap 1946 is not, however, ordinary non-modal predicate logic. The purpose of Carnap's article is to study modal logic. If L is a language of ordinary firstorder logic we may extend L to obtain a language L M . L M is simply the modal predicate language which extends L by the addition of the (monadic) necessity operator , and the formation rule that if α is a wff then so is α. The idea behind Carnap's account of modality is that (which he writes as N 9 ) is to be interpreted in such a way that α is to be true iff α is valid -or, as Carnap puts it on p. 54, iff α is L-true. We shall make this precise as follows. Where s is a state-description [Vϕ]-[V∀] shew how to extend |= to all LPC wff. To extend |= to all wff of L M in accordance with D9-5a (p. 54) we add the condition
Say that a wff is C−valid iff it is true in every state−description, when |= satisfies [Vϕ]−[V∀] and [V MFL ]. One result is that if α is S5−valid then α is C−valid. However (quantified) S5 is not complete for C-validity. This is because, where ϕa is an atomic wff, ∼ ϕa is C-valid even though it is not a theorem of S5 -and similarly with any atomic wff. Carnap specifies an axiomatic system of modal predicate logic, which he calls MFC. His first set of axioms (p. 54) is simply a basis sufficient for S5:
LPC Where α is one of the LPC axioms PC-I3 then both α and α are axioms of MFC. 10 9 The symbol for necessity was devised by F.B. Fitch in 1945, and first appeared in print in Barcan 1946. I only met Carnap once, in 1970, shortly before his death. I asked him whether he or anyone else he knew of had ever used L for a necessity operator before Feys 1950, but he could not recall any information about that. (I find it convenient to use for logical necessity, which satisfies S5, and L for the kind of necessity formalised by weaker modal systems.) 10 Carnap separates this into a schema (D10-1a) which guarantees that PC is part of the basis, and then in D10-1, e to k, repeats our ∀ ⊃ -I3.
(A straightforward induction on proofs establishes the rule of necessitation, that if α is a theorem, so is α. 12 ) Carnap then includes some non−standard axioms, which shew that he is attempting to axiomatise C−validity. These are what Carnap calls 'Assimilation', 'Variation and Generalization' and 'Substitution for Predicates'. (Carnap 1946, p. 54f.) In our notation these can be expressed as follows:
, where α contains no free variables other than x , y, z 1 ,..., z n , and no constants and no occurrences of =.
, where α contains no free variables other than x , y, z 1 ,..., z n , and no constants.
, where α is a non-modal wff, and β is obtained from α by uniform substitution of a complex expression for a predicate.
None of these axiom schemata is easy to process, but it is not difficult to see what the simplest instances would look like. A very simple instance, which is of both Ass and VG is
To establish the validity of Ass ϕ it is sufficient to shew that if a and c are distinct constants then ϕabc ⊃ ϕbbc is valid. This is trivially so, since there is some s such that s =| ϕabc, and therefore for every s, s =| ϕabc, and so, for every s, s |= ϕabc ⊃ ϕbbc. More telling is the case of SP. Let ϕ be a one−place predicate and consider
In this case α is ϕx, while β is ϕx∧ ∼ ϕx, so that, in Carnap's words, β 'is formed from α by replacing every atomic matrix containing ϕ by the current substitution form of β'. 11 This principle is Carnap's T9-2 on p. 54 of Carnap 1946. The current name, 'Barcan Formula', comes from an equivalent formula first introduced in Barcan 1946, p. 2, Axiom 11. BF appears to have been first called the 'Barcan Formula' in Prior 1956, p. 60, where it is shewn derivable in S5. Even though Carnap includes BFC as an axiom, it is in fact derivable from the rest of the basis using only principles of non-modal logic together with LPC and K. By ∀1b we have (∀xα ⊃ α[a/x]) and so, by K, ∀xα ⊃ α[a/x] for every constant a. So choose some a not in ∀xα. Then, by theorem 2, we have that there are b1, ..., bn such that ∀xα ⊃ ∀x(x = b1 ∧ ... ∧ x = bn) ⊃ α). But we also have ∀xα ⊃ α[bi/x] for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and so, by theorem 3, we have ∀xα ⊃ ∀x α. 12 The only non-trivial case is the axiom T, where we require ∀( α ⊃ α), which is Carnap's theorem T4-1u on p. 42.
Thus we have ∼ (ϕa∧ ∼ ϕa), and so ∼ ϕa. 13 A completeness result for C-validity is not possible. For, although Carnap appears to have it in mind to axiomatise C-validity, it is easy to see that it is not recursively axiomatisable. For, by [V MFL ], where α is any LPC wff, α is not LPC-valid iff ∼ α is C-valid, and so, if C-validity were axiomatisable then LPC would be decidable. 14 There is a hint on p. 57 that Carnap may have recognised this. He is certainly aware that the kind of reduction to normal form, with which he achieves the completeness of propositional S5, is unavailable in the predicate case, since it would lead to the decidability of LPC.
It is however worth looking at a modification of Carnap's semantics which brings it into line with the current indexical semantics for modal logic.
Let Σ be a class of state-descriptions, where each s ∈ Σ satisfies [Vϕ]-[V∀], and [V MFL ] is replaced by
Say that a sentence α is valid in Σ iff s |= α for every s ∈ Σ, and say that α is Σ + −valid iff α is valid in every Σ. With this change it is easy to see that ∼ ϕa is not Σ + -valid, since one need only consider, for instance, a class Σ whose only member is a state-description s, where s contains ϕa. In fact one can prove that a Carnapian version of the standard axiomatic basis for predicate S5 is complete for this semantics. To avoid confusion with Carnap's MFC, which does contain the non-standard axioms, I shall refer to the system for which completeness is to be proved as FC+S5. That is to say, completeness can be proved with respect to the semantics based on an arbitrary set of state-descriptions, for the basis which consists of LPC -BF, but not containing Ass, VG or SP.
It is easy to establish that all the axioms of FC + S5 are Σ + −valid, and that MP preserves Σ + −validity. For completeness we need some standard results from modal logic. Where Λ is a set of sentences let L − (Λ) denote the set consisting precisely of every sentence β for which β is in Λ. I.e., L − (Λ) = {β : β ∈ Λ}.
Lemma 11. Let Λ be a set of sentences containing ∼ α. Then L − (Λ) ∪ { ∼ α} is FC+S5-consistent. 15 The following theorem should be compared with theorem 14.2 on p. 259 of Hughes and Cresswell 1996. 13 I.e., where β is ϕx ∧ ∼ ϕx , it replaces α's ϕx . If α had been more complex and contained ϕy as well as ϕx , then the replacement would have given ϕy∧ ∼ ϕy, and so on, where care needs to be taken to prevent any free variable being bound as a result of the replacement. Substitution of complex expressions for predicates is a complex business. For a hint of some of the complexities of substitution rules for predicates see Church 1956 p. 289f. Carnap spells out the rule for substitution for predicates in D10-1p on p. 55.
14 Although that is so it has not always been regarded as a criticism. Theorem 12. If Γ is a maximal-consistent set of sentences in some language (say L + ) of modal predicate logic, and Γ has the ∀-property in L + , and α is a sentence such that α ∈ Γ, then there is a consistent set ∆ of sentences of L + with the ∀-property such that
Proof. We define a sequence of sentences γ 0 ,γ 1 , γ 2 , ... etc. γ 0 is ∼ α. Given γ n we define γ n+1 as follows. Let ∀x δ be the n+1th sentence of that form and let a be the first constant such that
We shew that provided L − (Γ) ∪ {γ n } is consistent there will always be an a which satisfies (i). Suppose there were not. Then, for every constant a, there will exist some
so, by principles of S5 16
But Γ is maximal consistent and β 1 , ..., β k ∈ Γ, and so
Now (iv) holds for every constant a, and Γ has the ∀-property. What this means is this. Let z be some variable not occurring in δ or in γ n , and consider ∀z (γ n ⊃ ∼ (δ[z/x] ⊃ ∀xδ)). Since Γ has the ∀-property there will be a constant a such that
and so, by BF,
Since z does not occur in γ n or δ then by ∀ ⊃ and VQ we have in Γ But then ∼ γ n ∈ Γ and so ∼ γ n ∈ L − (Γ) which would make L − (Γ)∪{γ n } inconsistent. Now assume that Λ is an FC+S5-consistent set of sentences, and that Γ is a maximalconsistent set of sentences with the ∀ C -property constructed in accordance with the procedure of theorem 9. By corollary 8, Γ has the ∀-property. Let Γ + be the set of all maximal consistent sets w with the ∀-property, such that L − (Γ) ⊆ w . The presence of T ensures that L − (Γ) ⊆ Γ, and therefore that Γ ∈ Γ + . Let Σ be the set of all state descriptions s w where, for w ∈ Γ + , s w is the state-description which consists of ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ if ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ w , and ∼ ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ s w if ϕa 1 ...a n ∈ w . We then have the following analogue of theorem 10:
Theorem 13. For any w ∈ Γ + , s w |= α iff α ∈ w Proof. The inductive proof is as for theorem 10, except for the induction for . Suppose that β ∈ w. Then β ∈ Γ, since if not, by 5, ∼ β ∈ Γ, and then ∼ β ∈ w. But if β ∈ Γ then β ∈ w for every w ∈ Γ + , and so, by the induction hypothesis, s w |= β for every s w ∈ Σ, and so s w |= β. If β ∈ w then ∼ β ∈ Γ, since if β ∈ Γ then β ∈ Γ and then β ∈ w. But if ∼ β ∈ Γ then, by theorem 12, there is some w ∈ Γ + such that β ∈ w . So, by the induction hypothesis, s w =| β, and so s w =| β.
From theorem 13 it follows that the members of Λ are true in s Γ , and therefore, since Γ ∈ Γ + , true in some s ∈ Σ, thus establishing the completeness of FC+S5 with respect to Σ + -validity.
Finally we shall revisit Ass-SP. As noted, neither they nor any other recursively specified axiom set is complete for C-validity. However, a rather trivial completeness proof is possible based on Σ + −validity. MFC is FC + S5, with the addition of all instances of Ass-SP. Let a sentence α be MFC−valid iff α is valid in every class Σ of state-descriptions on which every instance of Ass-SP is valid. It is trivial that MP preserves MFC−validity. 17 
So if
MFC α then α is MFC−valid. If MFC α then, where ∆ consists of all instances of Ass-SP, ∆ ∪ {∼ α} is FC+S5-consistent. So, according to theorem 13, there is a class Σ of state descriptions such that, for some s ∈ Σ , every instance of Ass-SP is true at s but α is not; which is just to say that α is not MFC−valid.
Appendix: Proofs of theorems 2 and 3, and lemma 4:
The proofs of the following three results have no theoretical interest, except to establish that they do indeed follow from Carnap's axioms, as presented in this paper. Where the justification for a line of the proof is given by merely citing earlier lines of the proof the line is obtained from an instance of PC or ∀ ⊃ and applications of MP.
Theorem 2:
Proof. The theorem may be proved as follows. Assume 
